If AI can do the homework, what is school for?

A child sits down at the kitchen table with an essay due the following morning. The subject is the causes of the First World War. She could read a chapter, make notes, decide which causes mattered most, struggle with the structure, write a poor first paragraph and gradually work out what she thinks. Or she could ask an AI system to produce 1,200 words at the appropriate level and be upstairs ten minutes later.

The first instinct of many schools has been to make AI harder to use. Phones are banned, more work is supervised, detection software is bought, coursework is redesigned and, in some cases, students are sent back to pen and paper. Some of this is sensible, particularly while schools work out what AI means for assessment. But it risks becoming an elaborate effort to recreate the conditions under which the old system worked, rather than asking a more uncomfortable question: does homework still provide the evidence of learning that we once assumed it did?

Until recently, an essay seemed to offer reasonably reliable evidence of learning. It was the visible result of an invisible process involving reading, confusion, selection, argument, doubt and revision. If a student produced a decent essay, it was reasonable to assume that some of that intellectual work had taken place. AI has made the assumption much less secure. It can produce the finished piece without requiring much of the thinking that once lay behind it.

That is why the debate so quickly becomes one about cheating, but cheating is only part of the problem. Education has always relied on proxies for learning because they are convenient to collect. Essays, worksheets, problem sets and examinations can be marked, compared and graded. Actual understanding is much harder to package. While producing the proxy required the student to do most of the thinking, the distinction hardly mattered. Now it does.

There is another complication. AI is not a temporary classroom nuisance that schools can wait out. The children using it today are likely to enter universities and workplaces where AI is simply part of how work gets done. They will use it to research, analyse, write, code, design, translate, plan and solve problems. In many jobs, using these systems well will not be an optional extra but part of being competent at the job. An education system that responds by keeping AI away from pupils may therefore succeed in protecting an assessment while leaving them less prepared for the world being assessed for.

That does not mean giving children an AI assistant for every task. Writing remains one of the ways we discover what we think, and anyone who has tried to explain a complicated idea on paper knows how often a supposedly clear thought collapses when it encounters a sentence. Knowledge matters too. Someone who knows almost nothing about a subject is badly equipped to judge an answer that is fluent, plausible and wrong. As machines become more convincing, that judgement becomes more valuable rather than less.

The issue is therefore not whether students should use AI, because increasingly they will. It is when they should use it, when they should work without it, and whether they understand enough to know the difference. Someone learning arithmetic still needs to understand multiplication before relying on a calculator. In much the same way, a student needs enough command of writing, research or reasoning to recognise when an AI has produced something weak. But once that foundation exists, deliberately denying them the tools they will use after school begins to look rather artificial.

What changes is the assumption that producing an answer proves understanding. A student might be allowed to use AI to prepare an essay and then be asked to defend it. Why is this evidence stronger than that evidence? Which claim are you least certain about? What would a historian who disagreed with you say? Which part of the AI’s argument did you reject? A student who understands the subject will usually cope. One who has merely commissioned a competent answer from a machine will often reveal that fairly quickly.

Examinations become more interesting in this world because they offer something coursework increasingly cannot: some certainty about what a student can do unaided. Put thirty students in a room, remove their phones and hand them a paper and you have a reasonably secure measure of that. There is still value in knowing it. The mistake would be to assume that unaided performance is the only capability worth measuring when almost nobody will work that way once they leave education.

Exams also have distortions of their own. They reward recall under pressure, speed, exam technique and the ability to perform on a particular morning, none of which is quite the same as judgement, creativity, collaboration or working through a difficult problem over several days. A student can be excellent at exams and less good at the kind of thinking adult life requires, while another can understand a subject deeply and perform badly in a silent hall at nine o’clock on a Tuesday.

Assessment may therefore need to become more varied rather than simply more secure. We need to know what a student can do unaided, but also what they can do with AI, with other people, under uncertainty and over time. That could mean closed-book examinations alongside oral defence, collaborative projects, practical work and assignments in which AI use is expected and the student is assessed on the quality of their judgement. Perhaps they should sometimes be required to show how they used AI, what they rejected and what they changed. Knowing how to challenge a machine may become as important as knowing how to operate one.

There is another reason school matters that gets less attention in discussions about educational technology. Children do not go there only to acquire information. They go there to encounter other children. They learn how to join a group, contribute to one and occasionally survive one. They collaborate with people they would not necessarily have chosen as friends, argue, compromise, lead and follow. Somewhere along the way they discover that being right is not always enough if nobody wants to work with you.

Friendship, embarrassment, loyalty, boredom, rivalry, kindness and the occasional spectacular falling-out do not appear neatly on a curriculum, but they shape people nevertheless. So does discovering that values become harder when they encounter other people. Fairness sounds straightforward until two children both believe they have been treated unfairly. Respect is easy in the abstract and rather harder when somebody has just taken your place in the team. Debate involves learning not merely how to argue, but how to listen closely enough to understand why somebody sensible might disagree.

School also gives children repeated experiences of success and disappointment at a scale they can usually survive. They get picked and not picked, praised and criticised, win and lose, produce work they are proud of and work they would rather forget. They learn that effort does not guarantee victory and that failure, although unpleasant, is usually temporary. Resilience grows through those experiences rather more effectively than it does from a lesson about resilience.

AI can help with many parts of education, but it cannot reproduce this social world. Nor does its arrival make teachers redundant. Information is abundant and explanations are becoming abundant too. What remains scarce is the experienced human being who notices that a pupil has misunderstood something, asks the question that reveals why, or recognises that a child who appears lazy is actually lost, bored or frightened of getting something wrong. Good teachers create standards, model behaviour, resolve conflict and encourage effort. Much of that work has always been difficult to measure.

Perhaps AI is exposing something that was already true. Schools were built partly for a world in which knowledge was difficult to access and intellectual labour was expensive to perform. That world is disappearing quickly. A machine can now draft, summarise, translate, calculate and explain across a remarkable range of subjects. Keeping children away from those capabilities until they leave school would be an odd preparation for adult life, but allowing them to rely on them before they have learned to think for themselves would be equally misguided.

Education now has to do both. It has to develop independent minds and teach those minds how to work intelligently with machines. It has to produce people who can reason without AI when necessary, use it when useful, spot weak evidence and sophisticated nonsense, and still do the much older human things: collaborate, disagree, recover from failure, make friends and become someone other people can trust.

If AI can do the homework, school still has plenty to do. It may simply force us to become more honest about how much of the important work was never really the paper that got turned in after all.

An economy without first jobs

A curious reversal is taking place in the journey into adulthood. Young people leave home at eighteen, spend three or four years at university becoming educated and independent, then graduate and move back into the bedroom they thought they had left behind. Housing costs explain part of it, but something else is becoming harder to ignore: for many graduates, the first proper job is becoming extraordinarily difficult to get.

The numbers are uncomfortable. The Institute of Student Employers says major employers are now receiving about 140 applications for each graduate vacancy, compared with 38 two decades ago. The ONS reports that 28.7 per cent of 20 to 34-year-olds were living with their parents in 2025, up from 25.4 per cent a decade earlier. Those figures do not prove that graduates are moving home because AI took their jobs. They do show a labour market already under strain just as AI begins to change the economics of entry-level work. (ISCE)

You can see the human version in young people applying for dozens of jobs, sometimes more than a hundred, and hearing little or nothing back. They were told to work hard, go to university and acquire useful skills. Many did exactly that. They are now discovering that the first rung of the career ladder has become crowded just as employers are asking whether they need quite so many rungs.

The attraction for companies is obvious. If AI can draft contracts, write routine software, analyse accounts, summarise research and prepare presentations, firms will need fewer people doing work traditionally given to trainees and graduates. Each decision may be rational. The problem is that junior work has always done two jobs at once: it produced useful output and, almost accidentally, produced experts.

The senior engineer who knows that an architecture feels wrong has usually spent years seeing smaller systems go wrong. The lawyer who notices the dangerous clause has read thousands of harmless ones. Expertise often looks like instinct from the outside, but much of it is accumulated experience compressed into judgement. AI is becoming very good at removing precisely the tasks through which that experience was acquired.

So two problems are developing together. Companies may become more efficient today while weakening the pipeline of people capable of running them tomorrow, while society accumulates well-educated young adults who cannot get the experience required to become experienced. For a while firms can recruit people trained under the old system. That is a finite resource masquerading as a labour market.

Public policy still feels oddly behind the problem. Britain has an energetic AI agenda built around compute, investment, skills and AI Growth Zones intended to accelerate data centres and supporting infrastructure. The government has begun to acknowledge the employment issue, with measures announced in 2026 around entry-level jobs, AI training and graduate traineeships. But the balance remains revealing. We are planning where the servers will live and how they will be powered with considerably more urgency than how young people will enter the professions those servers are changing. (GOV.UK)

That deserves attention because this could become a social problem before it becomes an obvious economic one. A few graduates spending an extra year at home is ordinary family life. A generation repeatedly unable to establish careers, incomes, independence and confidence is something else. If the entry point into professional work shrinks significantly, the consequences will eventually appear in housing, family formation, tax revenues and politics, by which time the problem will be harder to unwind.

The answer is not to preserve pointless junior work, nor to send every graduate on another course in how to use AI. We may need mechanisms that deliberately bridge education and employment: government-supported graduate apprenticeships, temporary wage subsidies or grants that make taking on inexperienced people attractive, and partnerships between universities, employers and professional bodies that create genuine work experience rather than another certificate.

Companies have a responsibility too. If AI removes routine production, they will have to design apprenticeship rather than assuming it happens automatically. Junior lawyers can use AI to draft but must learn to challenge the draft. Young engineers can build with coding agents but should own what they build and investigate when it fails. The aim is to automate the drudgery without automating away the experiences from which judgement develops.

For decades, junior employment, useful work and professional education were bundled together, so nobody had to think very hard about the mechanism. AI is pulling them apart while the graduate labour market is already creaking. If we treat that simply as another productivity opportunity, we may discover too late that we have built an economy with fewer entry-level jobs, fewer future experts and a large number of young people still waiting for adult working life to begin.

The Eight Hours We Haven’t Planned For

In 1930 John Maynard Keynes made one of the most famous predictions in economics. Technological progress, he thought, would make his grandchildren so productive that they might need to work only 15 hours a week.

The prediction is usually remembered because it was wrong. People became vastly richer, but they continued to work.

Less often remembered is that Keynes was not entirely relaxed about the alternative. If technology eventually solved what he called the economic problem, humanity would encounter another one: what to do with its freedom. People had been trained for generations to strive, he argued, and might prove surprisingly bad at doing anything else. Those with money but few duties or ties did not strike him as particularly encouraging examples of life after work.

Two years later, in an Austrian village called Marienthal, researchers stumbled across a darker version of the same problem.

The village’s textile mill had closed, leaving most families dependent on unemployment support. Poverty obviously dominated what followed, which makes Marienthal a poor model for an affluent automated future. But something else happened that fascinated the researchers. Time itself seemed to change.

The unemployed men walked more slowly. Many stopped repeatedly while crossing the village. Most no longer wore watches. Library borrowing fell rather than rose. Presented with an abundance of time, people did not automatically fill it with reading, hobbies or civic life. The structure that had made time useful had disappeared.

Nearly a century later, artificial intelligence raises a much larger version of Keynes’s question.

Most discussion about AI and employment is understandably economic. Which jobs disappear? How quickly does productivity rise? Who owns the machines? How should the income they generate be distributed?

But suppose, eventually, that those problems can be solved. Imagine a society rich enough to provide people with comfortable lives even when relatively little human labour is required.

What will everyone actually do all day?

For most adults, work occupies roughly eight hours of every weekday. For children and teenagers, school does much the same. Add commuting, preparation, homework and the mental space occupied by both, and a remarkable proportion of human existence is organised around the requirement to be economically useful.

Now imagine that requirement begins to disappear.

Not because useful things no longer need doing, but because machines can do more of them, more cheaply and eventually better. They diagnose illnesses, write software, analyse businesses, prepare contracts, design buildings and teach mathematics. If robotics makes comparable progress, much physical labour may follow.

Intelligence becomes a utility. Eventually labour may begin to resemble one too.

The economic consequences would be enormous. The psychological consequences may be stranger.

Work does much more than produce income. It tells people when to wake up. It supplies colleagues, deadlines, routines and mild competition. It creates achievements and disappointments. It provides status and identity. It gives someone a reason to leave the house and, perhaps most importantly, gives other people reasons to expect them to arrive somewhere.

School performs a similar function for the young. It is supposedly an institution for transferring knowledge, but it is also a machine for structuring childhood. It puts several hundred young people in the same place at the same time. It forces them to coexist, encounter people they did not choose, play sport, sit examinations, perform plays, make friends, lose arguments, cope with boredom and occasionally discover that they are good at something they had never considered trying.

Remove much of work and school and society does not merely lose two institutions.

It loses much of its timetable.

Retirement gives us the closest existing approximation. Someone reaches sixty or sixty-five and, often quite abruptly, discovers that the institution which has organised much of adult life has disappeared.

Some flourish. They have family, friendships, travel, voluntary work, sport and projects waiting for them. Others discover that work had quietly been supplying much of their social world and sense of identity.

But a person retiring at sixty five has had four decades to work out who they are. They have accumulated relationships, interests and obligations. With luck, they know what gives shape to a Tuesday when nobody is paying them to be somewhere at nine o’clock.

An eighteen year old has not.

That may be the harder problem.

If an eighteen year old enters a world in which employment is optional, scarce or simply unnecessary, what exactly are they supposed to do with the next seventy years?

At that age most people have barely begun to discover what they care about. School, university and work provide tracks to follow while identity gradually forms. They impose sequence. Study this. Qualify. Find work. Become better at something. Change direction. Perhaps raise a family. Eventually retire.

Remove the tracks and society may give young people unprecedented freedom before they have developed the judgement required to use it.

The immediate alternatives are not wholly reassuring.

An enormous industry already exists whose purpose is to capture unclaimed attention. Social networks, games, streaming services and personalised entertainment compete continuously for spare minutes. If work releases another eight hours a day, some of the richest companies in history will have every incentive to occupy them.

The technologies will also become better at the job. AI will be able to create endless games, stories, relationships and virtual worlds tuned precisely to the psychology of one individual. Boredom may become technologically obsolete.

A society could therefore achieve something close to material abundance while millions of people spend much of their lives inside experiences optimised to stop them leaving.

Yet boredom may not be the deepest difficulty.

Decades of research into unemployment suggest that employment supplies several things besides pay: structure to time, social contact, status, regular activity and participation in a collective purpose. Marie Jahoda, one of the researchers at Marienthal, later called these the latent functions of work. Modern research still finds links between these functions and mental wellbeing.

But there may be something underneath all of them.

People want to matter.

Psychologists use that word in a fairly precise way. Mattering means not simply believing that your life has purpose, but feeling significant to other people. One component is dependence: the knowledge that somebody relies on you. Another is the feeling that your actions genuinely make a difference.

This suggests that the usual discussion about the end of work may be asking the wrong question.

We ask what people will do.

Perhaps we should ask who will need them.

There is an important difference.

I can decide that learning Portuguese is my purpose. I can spend five years becoming an excellent pilot. I can go to the gym every other day, ride horses or study astronomy. All could make my life richer.

But if I decide not to do any of those things tomorrow, nobody necessarily suffers.

Work is different because it often makes our actions consequential to other people. A patient expects the doctor. A pupil expects the teacher. A customer expects the plumber. Your colleague needs the report because she cannot finish something until you do.

Even an ordinary job embeds a person in a small network of dependence.

The uncomfortable possibility is that AI does not merely make us less necessary to the economy. It makes us less necessary to one another.

If an AI can teach the child, diagnose the patient, repair the machine, give the legal advice, drive the passenger and perhaps eventually provide companionship, many of the practical reasons humans have historically had to depend upon other humans begin to weaken.

Materially, this could be wonderful.

Socially, it presents a peculiar problem.

A world in which nobody needs to do very much for anyone else may be comfortable while also making it harder to answer one of the oldest human questions: where would there be a hole if I disappeared?

AI could even simulate the answer. An artificial companion could tell you that it missed you. A game could give you a vital mission. A virtual organisation could provide status, promotion, difficulty and praise.

But there is a difference between being told that you matter and knowing that something outside yourself actually depended upon your turning up.

That distinction may become increasingly valuable.

The same is true of time.

Work and school do something so familiar that we barely notice it: they synchronise millions of lives.

Monday morning means roughly the same thing to everybody. Evenings are when many people stop working. Children have school holidays together. Saturday afternoon works as a social institution because large numbers of people are available at the same time.

Research into time use shows that this synchronisation matters. Couples actively coordinate working hours to create shared leisure, and people whose routines are badly out of step with society often pay a social cost.

This leads to a curious possibility.

A post work society could have an abundance of individual free time and a shortage of common time.

If everybody is free whenever they like, everybody may choose differently. The rhythms that currently coordinate us could weaken along with the jobs that created them.

Saturday means something partly because Monday exists.

This is why simply building more leisure facilities does not quite solve the problem.

A future rich in sports centres, parks, workshops, libraries and virtual worlds might offer people an extraordinary range of activities. But activities are not the same as obligations, and private leisure is not the same as shared life.

The institutions that matter most may therefore be those that create two things work currently supplies almost accidentally: mutual dependence and common time.

A football team does this. Training is on Wednesday because everyone has agreed that Wednesday is when they train. If the goalkeeper does not appear on Saturday, ten other people notice.

An orchestra does it. So does a theatre company, a voluntary organisation, a scientific project, a community garden, a care network or a group restoring a woodland. Their value is not simply that they keep people busy. They create roles in which other people rely on you.

Perhaps that is the infrastructure a post-work society would actually need.

Not organised leisure, exactly. Something closer to organised significance.

It would need institutions capable of creating what might be called voluntary necessity: commitments freely chosen, but real enough that once chosen they impose duties.

There is a paradox here. We imagine freedom as the removal of obligations. A society liberated from compulsory work might discover that a satisfying life requires putting some obligations back.

The difference is that people could choose which ones.

Instead of being compelled by economic necessity to spend forty hours a week doing whatever the labour market happens to reward, people might have much greater freedom to choose the communities, skills, causes and people to whom they wish to become useful.

That could be one of AI’s more attractive consequences.

It might allow societies to distinguish for the first time at scale between what is economically necessary and what is humanly necessary.

Looking after an elderly neighbour may generate little GDP. Raising children, maintaining a community garden, mentoring a teenager or helping run a local charity can be economically marginal while being deeply consequential to the people involved.

Our present economy often gets this backwards. Some of the activities people consider socially valuable are poorly paid, while some highly paid work leaves those doing it wondering whether anything would change if the job disappeared.

AI could deepen that absurdity, or help us escape it.

Education would then have to change too.

If an infinitely patient AI tutor can teach algebra, chemistry or French, schools may need to spend less time transmitting information and more time teaching young people how to participate in human institutions.

How do you become someone others can rely upon? How do you cooperate, lead, lose, persist, make friends, resolve conflict and keep a commitment after the enthusiasm that produced it has disappeared?

These are not secondary skills in a post-work society. They may become the central ones.

A good school might still teach history and mathematics, but its deeper task would be to help a young person discover not merely what interests them but where they can become useful to others.

That is harder than teaching algebra. Algebra has a syllabus.

A life does not.

There is good reason nevertheless to be optimistic.

Human beings have never shown much enthusiasm for doing nothing. When released from necessity they repeatedly invent difficulty. They run marathons, climb mountains, become obsessive gardeners, learn musical instruments, compete at sport and spend years mastering skills with almost no economic value.

The problem is not that humans lack the desire to strive.

It is that the market has spent several centuries performing the useful function of connecting that striving to a social structure.

The next task may be to make those connections without requiring a wage.

That is why retirement is an incomplete model for the future. A sixty five year old often enters retirement already embedded in a lifetime of relationships and obligations. There may be children, grandchildren, old colleagues, clubs, neighbours and interests accumulated over decades. Work disappears, but the person does not start again from nothing.

An eighteen year old may.

So perhaps the most important question raised by a post-work society is not how an eighteen-year-old fills seventy years of leisure.

It is how, over those seventy years, they become entangled in the lives of other people.

For most of human history necessity did much of that work for us. Families depended upon one another because survival demanded it. Communities depended upon cooperation. Employers needed workers. Workers needed wages. Scarcity forced humans into relationships of mutual reliance whether they liked it or not.

AI may loosen some of those bonds by solving the scarcity that created them.

That should still be welcomed. There is nothing intrinsically noble about drudgery, poverty or having no choice about how to earn a living.

But removing economic necessity does not remove the human need to be consequential.

If anything, it makes that need more visible.

The deepest challenge of the AI age may therefore turn out not to be finding enough things for humans to do. Machines and entertainment systems can provide endless things to do.

The harder task will be constructing a society in which people still have reasons to need one another.

For most of modern history we have asked young people: what can you learn to do that somebody will pay you for?

An eighteen year old in an age of abundant intelligence may face a much larger question.

Who will you choose to become useful to?

A good society would make sure there are many answers.